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Abstract
We study the optimal extraction of two non-renewable resources when ex-
traction costs depend on cumulative previous extraction. Deﬁning a complete
user cost of natural resources, including environmental damages, allows us to
greatly simplify the resolution. It allows us to describe, in a ﬁrst stage, poten-
tial optimal extraction paths of the two resources. It also reduces the problem
to one with a unique stock variable, which can easily be solved through time
elimination. We also caracterize the evolution of the carbon-price and ﬁrm
rents.
This framework is applied to a study of oil and coal optimal extraction.
The extraction cost of oil is initially lower than the one of coal, but it increases
more rapidly with extraction. In a business as usual scenario, without taking
into account environmental costs, the optimal path is to use only oil in a ﬁrst
time phase, before using simultaneously the two resources in a second phase,
until the backstop becomes proﬁtable. As coal becomes cheaper to extract,
it provides for the largest part of extraction in the second time phase.
When the carbon price is taken into account, through a tax or emission
permits, the optimal path relies much less on the more polluting coal, prices
are higher and the backstop is reached much earlier.
If the backstop price is very high, extraction lasts much longer and it is
possible that it becomes optimal to revert to the less polluting oil only in a
third time phase.
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We consider a model of optimal extraction of two non-renewable polluting
resources with a renewable non-polluting backstop1. As in Heal[1976] we
make the realistic assumption that unit extraction costs increase with the
cumulative amount of the resource which has already been extracted, as
extraction becomes more and more diﬃcult. Extraction of the resource will
stop not when it is exhausted but rather when extraction costs become too
high. This set-up makes more sense than the original Hotelling set-up where
the overall quantity of the resource is given and can be extracted at a zero
or possibly constant unit cost. In the Hotelling setting the resource scarcity
is absolute and the only problem is when to consume the existing quantity.
In the setting we adopt, scarcity is economic, which appears much more
satisfactory. Extraction will stop when it becomes too costly in comparison
to other non-renewable resources as well as renewable backstops presently too
costly to be used. Oil for instance will not cease to be used when resources
will be exhausted but when the high level of extracting costs will choke
extraction. As Sheikh Yamani famously said, "the Stone Age did not end for
lack of stone". More concretely the level of exploitable oil resources has been
constantly reevaluated upward as new discoveries were made but also, and
more and more, as higher extraction costs became acceptable.
Heal’s approach has been followed by Hanson[1980] and more recently,
Hoel[2011], Bureau[2008], Van der Ploeg and Withagen[2011] and others
Our ﬁrst aim, in this paper, is to put forward a new and synthetic in-
terpretation of the intertemporal trade-oﬀs faced by economic agents when
using natural resources. To this end, we deﬁne a complete user cost of nat-
ural resources. This notion is standard in the case of physical capital. If K is
capital, δ the physical rate of depreciation and I = K˙ + δK the investment
ﬂow, the user cost of capital is (r+δ)K, including the physical cost of depre-
ciation and the interest charge of holding an amount K of capital. The user
cost is the true cost of using capital and allows to deﬁne instantaneous proﬁt
in a meaningful way. The total cost of using capital over time may then be
represented alternatively by the discounted value of investment ﬂows or by
the discounted value of user costs. The equivalence between these two mea-
sures follows from pure accounting and, more speciﬁcally, by an integration
by parts of the discounted integral of proﬁts.
We deﬁne in a similar way the complete user cost of natural resources.
Its ﬁrst component is the true measure of the extraction costs currently
supported. It takes the form of an interest charge on cumulative extraction
costs. A second component of the cost is environmental, as the use of fossil
1I acknowledge the support of the French National Research Agency (ANR) under the
CLEANER project (ANR_NT09_505778).
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fuels generates greenhouse gas emissions which contribute to global warming.
It takes the usual form of a damage function.
To our knowledge, the notion of an user cost of natural resources has
not been stated explicitely in the literature. It appears implicitely in Van
der Ploeg and Withagen[2011]2 but the corresponding equation is derived
from optimality conditions, rather than from an a priori reformulation of the
problem in terms of complete user costs. On the other hand, the integration
by parts which leads to this reformulation appears in a number of articles
on renewable or non renewable resources: see Spence-Starett[1975], who
developed a general analysis of models where the Hamiltonian is linear with
respect to the control variable and studied most rapid paths converging to a
singular solution; see also Leonard-Long[1992], who use it in various contexts.
But again no general presentation of the user cost and its importance is
oﬀered. In d’Autume[2012], we also use the user cost of natural resources
to study the optimal behavior of an extracting ﬁrm, that is a model where
the Hamiltonian is linear with respect to the extraction rate.
The deﬁnition of complete user costs provides an intuitive and simple
method to characterize the optimal extraction path of two non-renewable
resources, say oil and coal. This issue has been examined in numerous articles
and in particular in recent papers by Van der Ploeg and Withagen[2011]
and Chakravorty, Moreaux and Tidball[2008]. Both articles stress a possible
energy reversal, that is a return to a resource which had earlier been forsaken,
a phenomenon which may also appear in our own setting. Our framework is
close to the one of Van der Ploeg andWithagen[2011], but we treat the case of
two non-renewable resources whereas they treat, for simpliﬁcation, the second
resource, coal, as a dirty renewable backstop. Our framework diﬀers more
markedly from the one used in Chakravorty, Moreaux and Tidball[2008]. On
one hand, they do not introduce extraction costs increasing with the quantity
already extracted. On the other hand, we do not take into account natural
emission absorption, which is admittedly a limitation of our approach.
Our approach allows us to characterize, in a ﬁrst stage, possible extrac-
tion paths, before studying optimal dynamics. We then reduce the dynamic
system to one state variable, namely total resource extraction.
Two diﬀerent typical conﬁgurations appear. In the ﬁrst one, the economy
begins to exploit the less costly resource and after some time switches to a
second regime where both resource are simultaneously extracted. During this
second time phase, the economy follows an iso-"user cost" curve, and does so
until the moment where the two costs simultaneously reach the cost of the
backstop, say solar energy. In the second conﬁguration, it proves impossible
2See equation (6).
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to follow the iso-cost after some point, as this would require that the extracted
stock of one of the resource decrease, which is impossible by deﬁnition. We
then face an irreversibility problem akin to the one considered by Arrow-
Kurz[1970] in the case of physical investment and the solution method is
similar to the one they proposed. We may then observe an energy reversal.
The economy may revert to a regime where one resource, the less polluting
one, is the sole to be extracted.
We use our framework to simulate the ordering of oil and coal extraction.
The extraction cost of oil is initially lower than the one of coal, but it increases
more rapidly with extraction. In a business as usual scenario, without taking
into account environmental costs, the optimal path is to use only oil in a ﬁrst
time phase, before using simultaneously the two resources in a second phase,
until the backstop becomes proﬁtable. As coal becomes cheaper to extract,
it provides for the largest part of extraction in the second time phase.
When the carbon price is taken into account, through a tax or emission
permits, the optimal path relies much less on the more polluting coal, prices
are higher and the backstop is reached much earlier. It may be the case that
the economy has to revert to an oil only regime if the polluting power of oil
is large.
1 The framework
The two resources and the backstop are perfectly substitutable in consump-
tion. Let q1, q2 and x be the consumption levels of the three goods. Current
utility is an increasing and concave function of total consumption:
U(q1 + q2 + x).
The resources diﬀer by their extraction costs as well as by their polluting
character.
For i = 1, 2, we denote at time t by qi,t and Zi,t the ﬂow of extraction of
resource i and the cumulated sum of past extractions, with an arbitrary and
unspeciﬁed initial point. Thus,
Z˙i,t = qi,t. (1)
As in Heal[1976], the unit extraction cost of resource i is an increasing,
diﬀerentiable and convex function Gi(Zi). This unit cost does not depend
on the ﬂow qi currently extracted.
Extraction also has a detrimental environmental impact. More speciﬁ-
cally, the two resources are fossil fuels the consumption of which generates
4
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GreenHouse Gases emissions which contribute to global warming. We do not
take into account the natural absorption of GreenHouse Gases by the envi-
ronment and simply assume that the stock of pollutants created by the use
of resource i is proportional to the stock already extracted,
Ei = φiZi
with a positive emission coeﬃcient φi of resource i. This implies3 E˙i = φiqi.
Current environmental damages are then deﬁned as
D (φ1Z1 + φ2Z2) ,
where D is an increasing, diﬀerentiable and convex function.
Lastly, we denote by pb the constant unit production cost of the backstop.
Under these assumptions, the social welfare takes the following form,
where r is rate of discount, identical in this framework to the consumers rate
of time preference4:Z ∞
0
e−rt [U (q1 + q2 + x)− pbx−G1 (Z1) q1 −G (Z2) q2 −D (φ1Z1 + φ2Z2)] dt.
(2)
2 The complete user cost of natural resources
We now introduce a user cost of natural resources.
For a moment, we consider a unique resource. Assuming that the unit
extraction cost does not depend on the quantity currently extracted implies
that the time required to extract a given quantity, or indeed the time proﬁle
of extraction, does not aﬀect the overall cost of extraction. Starting at time
T1 from an extraction level ZT1 and extracting between T1 and T2 a ﬂow qt,
the integral of wich is ZT2 has the following costZ T2
T1
G(Zt)qtdt =
Z ZT2
ZT1
G(z)dz = H(ZT2)−H (ZT1) (3)
3More generally, we might assume that the pollution stock associated with a resource
is an increasing and convex function Ei = fi (Zi) of cumulative extraction. This would
imply E˙i = f 0i (Zi) qi, so that the emission coeﬃcient of new extraction of resource i would
be an increasing of Zi. The pollution associated with extraction would then increase over
time as extraction becomes more and more diﬃcult.
4All variables depend on time. To simplify notations we omit the time index.
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It does not depend on the time proﬁle of extraction
The economic total cost of course does depend on this proﬁle, as it in-
corporates interest charges. For generality, let us consider a time varying
discount rate rt and deﬁne Rt =
R t
0
rsds. A simple integration by parts
yields5
Z T2
T1
e−RtG (Zt) qtdt = e−RT2H (ZT2)− e−RT1H (ZT1) +
Z T2
T1
e−RtrtH (Zt) dt
(4)
The total economic cost now includes the integral of rtH (Zt). As men-
tioned in the introduction, this relation is similar to the one which applies
in the case of physical investment. Let Kt be the stock of capital, δ its rate
of depreciation and It = K˙t+ δKt gross investment. A similar integration by
parts yields:Z T2
T1
e−RtItdt = e−RT2KT2 − e−RT1KT1 +
Z T2
T1
e−Rt (rt + δ)Ktdt
rtH (Zt) thus appears as the user cost of the resource stock, as (rt + δ)Kt
is the user cost of physical capital. In the simple capital model we consider,
one unit of capital is produced with one unit of generic good, so that K is
the cumulative cost which has to be supported to reach a capital level equal
to K. In the resource model, H(Z) is the cumulative cost which has to be
supported to reach a resource level Z6.
In our setting with two polluting non-renewable resources, this leads us
to the following deﬁnition and proposition7.
Deﬁnition 1 The complete user cost of natural resources is
Γ(Z1, Z2) = rH1 (Z1) + rH2 (Z2) +D (φ1Z1 + φ2Z2) (5)
Marginal complete user costs are the derivatives
Γi (Z1, Z2) = rGi (Zi) + φiD0 (φ1Z1 + φ2Z2) , i = 1, 2 (6)
5This detailed in appendix 1.
6The two models diﬀer regarding the utility side. In the physical capital model, utility
derives from the production made with the capital stock, so that K has a positive so-
cial value. In the resource model, utility derives from consuming the ﬂow of extraction.
Moreover Z has a negative social value, as a higher Z means higher marginal extraction
costs.
7The interest rate is the consumers’ discount rate and we treat it as constant.
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Proposition 2 Up to initial constants, social welfare is equal toZ ∞
0
e−rt [U (q1 + q2 + x)− pbx− Γ(Z1, Z2)] dt (7)
The complete user cost of natural resources Γ(Z1, Z2) is the sum of the
user cost of extraction and the environmental damage caused by emissions.
Social welfare may be expressed as the discounted value of the diﬀer-
ence between the utility derived from consuming natural resources and their
complete user cost.
We also deﬁne the two marginal complete user costs. As environmental
damages depend on the two stocks Z1 and Z2, the two marginal user costs
are linked and each one depends on the two stocks.
3 The ordering of the two resources extrac-
tion
Knowledge of the user costs is suﬃcient to characterize possible orderings of
extraction of the resources.
Z
1
min
Γ1 Γ2
Z
1
, Z
2
Figure 1: Extraction costs
3.1 The case without pollution
Let us ﬁrst consider the case without pollution. marginal user costs are simply
rG1 (Z1) and rG2 (Z2).
As the two resources as well as the backstop are perfectly substitutable
in consumption, they can only be produced simultaneously if they have the
same price. The price of a resource is not equal to its cost, as it includes a
7
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Figure 2: Extraction path 1
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Figure 3: Extraction path 2
scarcity rent. As we shall see8, however, the equality of prices over a time
interval is only possible if user costs are equal.
Without pollution, this reduces to the condition that current extraction
costs be equal:
G1 (Z1) = G2 (Z2) .
Let us consider the case of ﬁgure (1). Resource 1 is initially less costly to
extract than resource 2, but its cost increases more steeply. The two resources
may be extracted simultaneously only if cumulative extraction of resource 1
has reached the minimum level Zmin1 such that G1
¡
Zmin1
¢
= G2 (0). Figure
(2) plots the equal cost locus in the plane (Z1, Z2). As each cost increases
with its cumulative extraction level, the locus has a positive slope dZ2/dZ1 =
G01 (Z1) /G02 (Z2). At each point located above or to the left of the curve, the
extraction cost of the ﬁrst resource is lower than the one of resource 2 and
marginal user costs rG1 and rG2 are ranked in the same way.
The economy switches to the backstop at pointB on the ﬁgure, when both
8We develop in this section an intuitive analysis. All assertions wil be proved later on.
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Figure 4: Forsaking resource 2
extraction costs reach the price pb of the backstop9. The vertical and horizon-
tal lines through B are respectively the loci G1 (Z1) = pb and G2 (Z2) = pb.
The optimal path is intuitive. Remember than Z1 and Z2 cannot decrease.
Assume for exemple that the initial amounts already extracted correspond to
point O on ﬁgure (2). The initial user cost of resource 2 is higher than the one
of resource 1. It is optimal to extract only resource 1. As it is exploited, the
user cost of resource 1 increases. The economy moves on segment OI until
the two resources costs are equalized. The economy then starts extracting
simultaneously the two resources, at such rates that the two costs remain
equal. The economy moves on the curved segment IB.
The shares of the two resources may be read on the diagram. We have
q2/q1 = Z˙2/Z˙1 = dZ2/dZ1 = G01 (Z1) /G02 (Z2) which, as we have seen, is the
slope of the equal cost curve. This slope, i.e. the relative share of resource
2 extraction, decreases as exploitation goes on.
During this time period the price of energy increases until it reaches the
price of the backstop. Extraction then has to stop. The economy switches to
consumption of the backstop and the price of energy remains later on equal
to pb. Rents disappear so that the extraction costs are equal to the price of
the backstop.
Figure (3) considers the opposite case of a relatively high initial level of
Z1. The initial extraction cost of resource 1 is larger than the one of resource
2 so that the economy ﬁrst uses resource 2 only and moves on a vertical
straight line10 until it reaches the iso-cost curve.
9As Γi is a user cost, it cannot be compared to the price of the backstop. The relevant
comparison is between the discounted value of future user costs, which reduces here to
Γi/r = Gi and pb.
10Other cases would be the ones of initial very high levels of Z1 or Z2. The economy
would never extract simultaneously the two resources and would move on an horizontal or
9
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We thus have been able to characterize intuitively the extraction path
of the two resources. The formal dynamic analysis will only determine the
speed at which this path will be followed and, of course, conﬁrm our intuitive
results.
3.2 The case with pollution
We now consider the general case with environmental damages.
We again deﬁne the equal cost curve Γ1 (Z1, Z2) = Γ2 (Z1, Z2) curve in the
(Z1, Z2) plane. If this curve always has a positive slope, not much is changed.
The optimal ordering of exploitation of the two resources follows the same
principles than in the previous case. 11.
A second conﬁguration arises when the iso-cost curve reaches a maximum,
as in the case of ﬁgure (4). As Z2 cannot decrease, the economy cannot go on
following this curve. It ceases at some point to exploit resource 2 and engages
on the horizontal segment AB until the moment when the cost of extracting
resource 1 reaches the cost of the backstop.
For reasons which will be explained later, the economy does not reach the
maximum of the curve and forsakes extraction of resource 2 before reaching
it. The situation is one of irreversibility, as the Zis cannot decrease, and is
reminiscent of the Arrow-Kurz[1970] analysis of irreversible physical invest-
ment.
The optimal switch point is endogenous. In this more complicated case,
the optimal ordering of extraction cannot be determined ex ante, without
solving the dynamic model. It depends on all the elements of the model and,
in particular, on the utility function, that is on the demand side.
Let us now clarify the shape of the iso-cost curve. We may show that the
case of forsaking one resource only occurs if this resource is more polluting
than the other one, and suﬃciently so.
The slope of the curve is now
dZ2
dZ1
¯¯¯
¯
Γ2=Γ1
=
Γ11 − Γ21
Γ22 − Γ12
(8)
From (6),
Γ11 = G01 + (φ21/r)D00 > 0
Γ22 = G02 + (φ22/r)D00 > 0
Γ12 = Γ21 = (φ1φ2/r)D00 > 0
vertical straight line until it switches to the backstop. If both initial Z1 and Z2 were very
high, the economy would of course switch at once to the backstop.
11One diﬀerence is that the Γi(Z1, Z2)/r = pb are no more vertical or horizontal.
10
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Γ11 − Γ21 = G01 + (φ1 − φ2) (φ1/r)D00
Γ22 − Γ12 = G02 + (φ2 − φ1) (φ2/r)D00
Assume resource 2 to pollute more, so that φ2 > φ1. The denominator
of slope (8) is always positive, while the numerator may become negative, in
particular when D00 is high that is when total emissions become high. The
iso-cost curve then reaches a maximum and the economy forsakes extraction
of the polluting resource at some point before reaching the maximum12.
The previous derivatives also allow to calculate the slopes of the curves
describing the switch to the backstop :
dZ2
dZ1
¯¯¯
¯
Γ1=pb
= −Γ11Γ12
, dZ2dZ1
¯¯¯
¯
Γ2=pb
= −Γ21Γ22
.
Both are negative. In the more natural case, the cross terms are smaller
which implies that the Γ1/r = pb curve is steeper than the Γ2/r = pb curve.
4 The dynamic analysis
4.1 Optimality conditions
The problem is to maximize social welfare (7) under the resource constraints.Z ∞
0
e−rt [U (q1 + q2 + x)− pbx− Γ (Z1, Z2)] dt
Z˙1 = q1 ≥ 0, Z˙2 = q2 ≥ 0
Z1,0 and Z2,0 given.
Let pi, i = 1, 2 be the shadow prices of the two resource constraints.
Proposition 3 First order Conditions are the following
x ≥ 0, U 0 (q1 + q2 + x)− pb ≤ 0 (9)
qi ≥ 0, U 0 (q1 + q2 + x)− pi ≤ 0, i = 1, 2 (10)
p˙i = rpi − Γi (Z1, Z2) , i = 1, 2 (11)
with slackness conditions for the static conditions.
The proof is not reproduced.
12More complicated conﬁgurations, with several maxima, may occur.
11
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4.2 Resources prices, the carbon price and rents
Equation (11) states that the shadow price of a resource is the discounted
value of its future complete marginal user costs.This relation extends the
Hotelling rule to the case of endogenous extraction costs and environmental
costs. As the complete user cost is non decreasing, its discounted cumulative
value, namely the price, is also non decreasing.
Condition may also be written as a no arbitrage condition
r = Γi (Z1, Z2)pi
+
p˙i
pi
=
φiD0
pi
+
rGi (Z1, Z2)
pi
+
p˙i
pi
. (12)
Distinguishing the two components of the marginal user cost leads to
distinguish two components in the price of a resource.
The ﬁrst one is the discounted value of the marginal environmental dam-
ages it generates. It is the product of the emission coeﬃcient φi and the
carbon price τ , deﬁned as the discounted value of future marginal environ-
mental damages:
τ˙ = rτ −D0 (13)
The second part, say p2i , is the discounted value of marginal extraction
user costs:
p˙2i = rp2i − rGi
which yields
p2it =
Z ∞
t
e−r(s−t)rGisds.
An integration by parts yields13
p2it = Git +
Z ∞
t
e−r(s−t)G˙isds def= Git + ψit
with
ψ˙i = rψi − G˙i (14)
ψi is the discounted value of future extraction cost increases. As the analy-
sis of the competitive extraction ﬁrm behavior14 would show, it is the pro-
ducer rent gained by the resource ﬁeld owner. This rent reﬂects the scarcity
of the resource in the sense that extraction will become more and more costly.
It may increase with time, but will ultimately decrease and become zero when
the exploitation of the resource ceases.
13Letting u = Gis, dv = e−r(s−t)rds, du = G˙is, v = −e−r(s−t) and taking into account
the fact that Gis will remain constant after the backstop starts to be used.
14See d’Autume[2012]
12
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Proposition 4 The price of a resource
pi = Gi + φiτ + ψi (15)
is the sum of current marginal extraction cost, the carbon value of emissions
and the producer rent.
The carbon price is the discounted sum of future marginal environmental
damages, while the producer rent is the discounted value of future extraction
cost increases.
The price thus appears as the sum of the current extraction cost and the
discounted sum of all marginal damages inﬂicted by current extraction to
natural capital and the environment. Extraction reduces future extraction
possibilities and thus the value of natural capital. Extraction also leads to
emissions which aﬀect the environment and reduce its value.
In a competitive market economy the ﬁrst element takes the form of a
rent gained by the owner of the resource ﬁeld. The second element is the cost
of carbon emissions, which has to be internalized through a carbon-tax or a
market for emission permits.
4.3 The dynamics of aggregate resources and the two
regimes
As resources are perfectly substitutable we may deﬁne the total amount of
already extracted resources and the total extraction ﬂow
Z = Z1 + Z2 (16)
q = q1 + q2 = Z˙ (17)
We also deﬁne the demand function qd(p) as the inverse function of mar-
ginal utility.
Two types of regimes are possible depending on which resources are cur-
rently extracted.
Proposition 5 The regime with joint extraction of the two resources, q1 >
0, q2 > 0, is characterized as follows.
i) The two resources have the same price and the backstop is unused :
U 0 (q) = p < pb (18)
13
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ii) They have the same complete user cost:
Γ1 (Z1, Z2) = Γ2 (Z1, Z2) (19)
This cost can be expressed as a function Γ(Z) of total cumulative extrac-
tion.
iii) Cumulative extraction levels and extraction ﬂows may be expressed as
functions of total cumulative extraction and the total extraction ﬂow:
Z1 = ψ1(Z), Z2 = ψ2(Z)
q1 = ψ01(Z)q, Z2 = ψ02(Z)q
iv) The dynamics in this regime is described by the following system:
Z˙ = qd(p) (20)
p˙ = rp− Γ (Z) (21)
v) Eliminating time reduces the dynamics to the unique diﬀerential equa-
tion
p0(Z) = rp(Z)− Γ(Z)qd (p(Z)) , (22)
The two resources can obviously be simultaneously exploited if and only
if they have the same price, which has to be smaller than the price of the
backstop, in order to make production of the latter unproﬁtable.
From conditions (11) describing price evolutions, the two prices may be
equal for a ﬁnite time period only if both complete costs are equal15. Note
that prices are not equal to costs as implicit rents are present, but these rents
have to be equal.
From (19) and (16) we derive the shares of cumulative extractions Zi =
ψi (Z), as well as the shares of current extraction rates qi = Z˙i = ψ0i (Z) Z˙ =
ψ0i (Z) q.
We thus are led to a model with only one stock. Resolution is also sim-
pliﬁed by the fact that the terminal point is not be a saddle-point and will
be reached in ﬁnite time. This allows us to eliminate time and use a one
dimensional diﬀerential equation in the (Z, p) plane.
We have
p˙/Z˙ = (dp/dt) / (dZ/dt) = dp/dZ = p0(Z),
15As we stated earlier in our intuitive analysis.
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and Z˙ = qd(p). Using (11), and the equality of prices and costs, we are led
to diﬀerential equation (22).
Let us now consider the regime with extraction of the ﬁrst resource only.
Cumulative extraction of the second resource remains constant at level Z¯2
and we have
Z = Z1 + Z¯2
q = q1 > 0, q2 = 0
Proposition 6 The regime with extraction of the sole resource one is char-
acterized as follows
i) Prices and extraction ﬂows are such that
U 0 (q1) = p1 < min[p2, pb]
ii) The dynamics is
Z˙ = qd(p1)
p˙1 = rp1 − Γ1
¡
Z − Z¯2, Z¯2
¢
.
iii) Eliminating time yields
p01(Z) =
rp1 (Z)− Γ1
¡
Z − Z¯2, Z¯2
¢
qd (p1(Z))
(23)
iv) The price of resource 2 varies according to
p02(Z) =
rp2(Z)− Γ2
¡
Z − Z¯2, Z¯2
¢
qd (p∗1(Z))
(24)
where p∗1(Z) is the solution of (23), with an appropriate boundary condition.
The price of the sole resource which is extracted is smaller than the prices
of the two competing energy sources, which makes their use non-proﬁtable.
As we shall see, this does not require the complete user cost of the extracted
resource to be lower than the one of the second resource, as the two rents are
not equal.
These propositions validate our previous intuitive analysis of possible ex-
traction paths. The cost relations we described in section 3, and in particular
the equality of the two complete user costs of two resources when they are
simultaneously extracted are simply necessary conditions of the minimization
of the discounted total cost of producing a given ﬂow of resource q1t+q2t+xt,
for 0 ≤ t <∞. The maximization of social welfare clearly requires this min-
imization and it is easy to check that the description of the regimes follows
from this second and simpler problem.
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4.4 Global resolution in the case of an ever increasing
iso-cost curve
Let us consider a case, with pollution, where the iso-cost curve in the plane
(Z1, Z2) is always increasing up to the backstop point. The conﬁguration
is similar to the one in ﬁgure (2) but environmental damages are now part
of the problem. The iso-cost curve is represented by a function Z∗2(Z1). We
assume the initial point (Z1,0, Z2,0) to be such that Γ2 > Γ1, as in ﬁgure (2) .
The solution is of the following type:
- ﬁrst, a regime with resource 1 only extracted;
- second, a regime with the two resources extracted.
The model can be solved by simple backward recursion.
The terminal point is the switch point to the backstop. Cumulative ex-
traction is ZB such that Γ(ZB)/r = pb and the price level is p
¡
ZB
¢
= pb.
The dynamics in the regime with the two resources extracted is deter-
mined by diﬀerential equation (22) with terminal condition p ¡ZB¢ = pb.
The switch point
¡
ZI1 , ZI2
¢
between this regime and the ﬁrst one with
only resource 1 extracted is determined by ZI2 = Z2,0 = Z∗2(ZI1 ) and we have
ZI = ZI1 +Z2,0 . The price p(ZI) is known from the dynamics of the second
regime.
The dynamics of the ﬁrst regime is determined by (23) with a known
p(ZI) as terminal condition.
This completes the determination of the optimal solution p∗ (Z), for all
Z ∈
£
Z0, ZB
¤
.
It remains to check that this solution satisﬁes p2 > p1 at all point on
the ﬁrst regime trajectory, where Z2 = Z2,0. Price p∗2(Z) is then solution to
equation (24), with terminal condition p2(ZI) = p∗(ZI).
Let ∆p = p∗2(Z)− p∗(Z) and ∆Γ = Γ2(Z−Z2,0, Z2,0)−Γ1(Z−Z2,0, Z2,0).
∆p satisﬁes equation
∆p0(Z) = r∆p(Z)−∆Γ(Z − Z2,0, Z2,0)qd (p∗(Z)) (25)
In the time dependent equivalent equation, ∆p is the discounted value of
future ∆Γ up to ZA at which point it is zero. As ∆Γ is positive for all Z
between Z0 and ZA, ∆p is positive on this interval, as it should to prevent
extraction of resource 2.
The optimal trajectory p∗(Z) is thus determined for all Z ∈
£
Z0, ZB
¤
.
The evolution of p as a function of time then follows from the resolution of
diﬀerential equation
Z˙(t) = qd (p∗(Z(t))) , Z(0) = Z0
16
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Figure 5: Possible solutions
The evolution of all other variables follows.
4.5 The resolution in the case of an iso-cost curve with
a maximum
Let us now consider the case of ﬁgure (4). The point where the two user
costs, divided by r, simultaneously reach the cost of the backstop is now over
the maximum of the iso-cost curve, in its decreasing section.
We now face an irreversibility problem as cumulative extraction Z2 cannot
be decreasing. The optimal solution ends with a phase where only resource 2
is extracted, following the phase where the two resources are jointly extracted.
Consider ﬁgure (5). The problem is to determine the point
¡
ZA1 , ZA2
¢
where the trajectory leaves the upward sloping iso-cost curve to engage in an
horizontal trajectory. The ﬁgure identiﬁes two possible solutions.
i) Point
¡
ZA1 , ZA2
¢
is at the maximum of the iso-cost curve. The path
followed in the ﬁnal "resource one only" regime would lie completely in the
Γ2 > Γ1 region, that is in a region where ∆Γ = Γ2 − Γ1 > 0. On the other
hand the price gap ∆p = p2 − p1 has to be non negative at all points of the
last regime16, in order to forbid the use of resource 2. Following equation
(11) and its interpretation, the price gap is an average of future positive cost
gaps. It would be strictly positive at the initial point ZA = ZA1 + ZA2 of the
regime. This is impossible as the price gap has to be zero at any point on
the iso-cost curve. This ﬁrst trajectory is ruled out.
16It is strictly positive at the terminal point where Γ1/r = pb < Γ2/r.
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ii) The initial point
¡
ZA1 , ZA2
¢
is such that the economy reaches, at the
end of its horizontal trajectory, the point on the iso-cost curve where Γ1/r =
Γ2/r = pb = p1 = p2. A symetric argument rules out this path, as it lies
completely in the ∆Γ < 0 region. ∆p would be strictly negative at the initial
point of the regime.
This suggests that the optimal path lies between the previous two paths
we just considered. It is indeed possible to ﬁnd a path, lying alternatively
in the ∆Γ < 0 and ∆Γ > 0 regions, such that at the initial point we have
∆p = 0. As we show in the appendix a simple one dimensional loop allows
to determine the optimal path.
Note that during the ﬁrst part of this optimal path, which lies below
the iso-cost curve, the complete user cost of resource 2 is lower than the
one of resource 1 and yet resource 2 is not extracted. The static comparison
of complete user costs is insuﬃcient to determine which resources should
currently be exploited.
5 Simulations
We use the following functions
Gi (Zi) = ci + giZi, D0(E) = δE2/2
Then
Γi(Z1, Z2) = r (ci + giZi) + φiδ (φ1Z1 + φ2Z2)2 /2
The slope of the curve is now
dZ2
dZ1
¯¯¯
¯
Γ2=Γ1
=
Γ11 − Γ21
Γ22 − Γ12
=
g1 − φ1(φ2 − φ1) (δ/r) (φ1Z1 + φ2Z2)
g2 + φ2(φ2 − φ1) (δ/r) (φ1Z1 + φ2Z2)
We assume a higher emission coeﬃcient for resource 2, coal, than for
resource 1, oil, ie φ2 > φ1.
The denominator is always positive. The numerator is positive if the
stock φ1Z1 + φ2Z2 of emissions is low but becomes positive when it is larger
than rg1
δφ1(φ2 − φ1)
We thus have the conﬁguration of ﬁgure (4), with a possible decreasing
part of the iso-cost curve.
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The marginal utility is U 0(q) = d q−1/ε, which yields the following total
energy demand
q1 + q2 + x = qd(p) = (d/p)ε
Table 1 describes the 2009 oil and coal supplies and the CO2 emissions
they generate. We use these data as a benchmark for our rough calibration.
To make results more transparent, we express the price of oil in terms of
dollars per barrel, in a range of 50/100, while extraction annual ﬂows are
expressed in terms of billions of ton of oil equivalent, in a range of 1/5.
The calibration is the following.
c1 = 10, c2 = 25, g1 = 1/3, g2 = 1/6, φ1 = 1, φ2 = 1.5
r = .02, ε = .1, d = 4107, δ = 2.2 10−5
Z10 = 0, Z20 = 30.
Coal induces 50% more CO2 emissions than oil. Coeﬃcient δ describes
the weight of the environmental cost in the complete cost of the resources.
It is choosen so that the environmental cost of oil is equal to 6 when the
extraction cost is 30, that is when Z1 = 60 Z2 = 30, Γ1 = 36.
The cost of the backstop is pb = 80.
Tables 2, 3 and 4 and Figures 6, 7 and 8 describe the results of the
simulation.
Source : EIA Key World Energy Statistics
Table 1
Date 0 oil 1st switch oil/coal 2d switch backstop
Z1 0 60 210
Z2 30 30 330
q1 4.0 3.9/1.3 1.2
q2 0 0/2.6 2.5
p1 41.4 49.2 80
p2 44.2 49.2 80
G1 10 30 80
G2 30 30 80
µ1 31.4 19.2 0
µ2 14.2 19.2 0
time 0 15.3 134.3
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Table 2 Business as usual
Date 0 oil 1st switch oil/coal 2d switch bs
Z1 0 71.0 123.6
Z2 30 30 70.9
q1 3.8 3.8/1.9 2.3
q2 0 0/1.9 1.4
p1 56.7 71.1 80
p2 60.0 71.1 80
G1 10 33.7 51.2
G2 30 30 36.8
µ1 29.2 13.7 0
µ2 3.7 5.4 0
φ1τ 17.5 23.8 28.8
φ2τ 26.2 35.7 43.2
time 0 18.7 43.8
Table 3 With environmental damages
Date 0 oil 1st switch oil/coal 2d switch oil 3d switch bs
Z1 0 89.6 160.4 331.3
Z2 30 30 50.0 50.0
q1 3.6 3.5/3.5 2.9 3.3
q2 0 0/1.1 0.4 0
p1 115.6 170.8 230.2 300
p2 120.0 170.8 230.2 302.7
G1 10 39.9 63.5 120.4
G2 30 30 33.3 33.3
µ1 46.7 38.9 35.5 0
µ2 1.6 2.7 0 0
φ1τ 58.8 92.1 131.2 179.6
φ2τ 88.2 138.2 196.8 269.4
time 0 25.5 52.3 104.4
Table 4 A return to oil
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                          Figure 7 Taking into account environmental dammages 
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                                           Figure 8 A case with a return to oil 
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i) Business as usual
We ﬁrst assume that agents do not take into account environmental costs.
The extraction cost of oil is initially lower than the one of coal, but increases
more rapidly. After a ﬁrst regime where oil only is exploited a joint oil-coal
regime is sustained until the backstop become proﬁtable when cumulative
extractions reach respectively Z1 = 210 and Z2 = 330. In the ﬁrst phase only
oil is extracted at a level q1 close to 4. In the second phase, oil extraction q1
falls to a leval equal to 1.3 while coal extraction begins at q2 = 2.6. The last
three ﬁgures describe evolution as functions of time. As the carbon price is
not taken into account, fossil energy prices remain low for a long time and
their exploitation lasts for 134 years ! The last two ﬁgures describe the two
components of the two prices, namely extraction costs and rents. Producer
rents reach zero when extraction ceases. Coal rents are much lower than oil
rents.
ii) Taking into account carbon prices
We now assume that optimal carbon prices are incorporated into energy
prices. The economy thus follows an optimal path. Energy prices are higher
and extraction now stops much earlier, when Z1 = 123.6 and Z2 = 70.9, after
43.8 years. Contrary to the business as usual case, the economy relies much
less on polluting coal. The last two pictures describe the decomposition of
the two energy prices, which now include carbon prices, which leads to lower
rents, in particular in the case of oil.
iii) The case of a return to oil
With our calibration, the extraction path in the plane (Z1, Z2) reaches
a maximum when Z1 = 416 and Z2 = 130. The common complete cost of
the two energy is then equal to 353. Thus, if the price of the backstop was
higher than this level, the economy would eventually forsake coal extraction
and revert to a ﬁnal phase with oil only extraction.
To make stronger this phenomenon, we modify our calibration and now
assume higher environmental damages damages. The weight δ of damages
in the utility function is doubled to δ = 4.4 10−5. The backstop prices as
assumed to be pb = 300, which corresponds to a point located well after the
maximum of the iso-cost curve.
Coal exploitation is now temporary and takes place between years 25.5
and 52.3. Carbon prices are much higher, which reduces producers rents.
The rent of coal producers almost disappears.
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6 Appendix 1 Reformulation of Social Wel-
fare
Consider
A =
Z T2
T1
e−RtG (Zt) qtdt
Integrating by parts with u = e−Rt, dv = G (Zt) qt, du = −rte−Rtdt,
v = H(Zt) yields
A =
£
e−RtH (Zt)
¤T2
T1 +
Z T2
T1
e−RtrtH (Zt) dt
which is relation (4)in the text.
The same reasoning is applied to social welfare (2), where the integral
is taken between 0 and inﬁnity. The existence of the backstop prevents Zit
to tend to inﬁnity and ensures that limt→∞ e−rtHi(Zit) = 0. Relation (7)
follows.
6.1 Appendix 2 Determination of the optimal solution
in the case of an iso-cost curve with a maximum
Let us choose an arbitrary ZA1 in the increasing zone of the iso-cost curve
and deﬁne (as functions of ZA1 ) ZA2 , ZA, ZB1 and ZB such that
Γ1
¡
ZA1 , ZA2
¢
= Γ2
¡
ZA1 , ZA2
¢
Γ1
¡
ZB1 , ZA2
¢
/r = pb
ZA = ZA1 + ZA2
ZB = ZB1 + ZA2
Let psol(Z;ZA1 ) be the solution of diﬀerential equation (23) with terminal
condition p
¡
ZB
¢
= pb, on interval
¡
ZA, ZB
¢
.
Let psol2 (Z;ZA1 ) be the solution of diﬀerential equation
p02(Z) =
rp2(Z)− Γ2
¡
Z − ZA2 , ZA2
¢
qd (psol(Z;ZA1 ))
with terminal condition p2
¡
ZB
¢
= Γ2
¡
ZB1 , ZA2
¢
/r, as p2 will remain constant
later on.
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Figure 9: The solution
We now must ﬁnd the optimal ZAsol1 . The corresponding point on the
iso-cost curve must be such that both p1 = p2 and p˙1 = p˙2 that is, after time
elimination, such that
psol1 (ZAsol;ZAsol1 ) = psol2 (ZAsol;ZAsol1 )
and
p0sol1 (ZAsol;ZAsol1 ) = p0sol2 (ZAsol;ZAsol1 ))
Figure (??) describes the optimal path of p2 − p1, associated with the
optimal value of ZA1 , in the exemple we use later in our simulations. The
optimal point ZA is the one for which the curve reaches a local minimum
where p2 − p1 = 0. For a larger value of ZA1 , the value p2 − p1 is always
positive. For a lower value, p2−p1 takes negative values but there is no point
where both p2 − p1 and its derivative are simultaneously zero.
A simple one dimensional loop thus allows to determine the solution.
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